Archive for the ‘Inequitable Conduct/Rule 56’ Category

In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litigation – Making “Therasense” out of Confusion

Thursday, December 20th, 2012

Recently, a divided three judge panel sorting out a multi-party Hatch-Waxman suit, ruled that the patentee, Shinonogi, had not committed inequitable conduct in obtaining the patent that was subsequently reissued so as to obtain narrow claims focused on Rosuvastatin, or Crestor®, the popular cholesterol lowering drug. The majority of the panel also held that the patent was properly reissued due to error without deceptive intent. Although the deceptive intent element has been removed from the reissue statute by the AIA, it will remain relevant to earlier-filed reissues for some time to come. The opinion was subtitled AstraZenca UK Ltd v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd, 2010-1460 to 1473 (Fed. Cir., December 14, 2012) and involved multiple “generic company” defendants. (A download is available at the end of this post.)

After finding the Crestor claim non-obvious over a Sandoz reference that disclosed a sulfonylated analog, the panel spent 7 pages discussing IC and 10 pages discussing whether or not the reissue application was properly filed. In terms of IC, Fed. Cir. panels continue to be reluctant to find IC in cases in which multiple parties create “a string of mishaps, mistakes, misapprehensions and misjudgment,” particularly if the “purported culprits” are “inexperienced and overworked,” to use the language of the district court, that also found no IC. It probably helped that the only two “purported culprits” were both Japanese patent attorneys apparently working in Japan, although it is hard to fathom how they carried out the prosecution of a U.S pharma application and then reissued the resulting patent with no input from U.S. counsel, but none are mentioned. The Japanese attorneys had failed to file an IDS during prosecution of the ‘440 patent, and then filed for reissue, listing the two references on an IDS, and obtained the ‘314 reissued patent with claims essentially limited to Crestor.

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Federal Circuit Knocks Outside the Box’s Inequitable Conduct Charges Out of the Box

Tuesday, September 25th, 2012

The following is a guest post from Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner’s associate Ricardo Moran.

The issues on appeal were whether Travel Caddy, Inc. had committed inequitable conduct for: (i) not disclosing the existence of the litigation on U.S. Patent No. 6,823,992 (“the ‘992 patent”) during the prosecution of the application that matured into U.S. Patent No. 6,991,104 (“the ‘104 patent”; the ‘104 patent is a CON of the ‘992 patent; the ‘104 patent was filed shortly before the ‘992 patent issued); and paying small entity fees, even though Travel Caddy was not entitled to claim small entity status. (PDFs of both patents are available at the end of this post.)

Non-disclosure of the ‘992 patent litigation

To establish unenforceability based on inequitable conduct in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), it must be shown that (i) information material to patentability was withheld from the PTO, or material misinformation was provided to the PTO, with (ii) the intent to deceive or mislead the patent examiner into granting the patent. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290-92 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). Withholding of material information and intent to deceive or mislead must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1287 (citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

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1st Media, LLC v. Electronic Arts, Inc. – Specific Intent Means Specific Intent

Monday, September 17th, 2012

On September 13th, the Fed. Cir. reversed a district court ruling that the inventor and the attorney who prosecuted a chain of applications claimed multi-media entertainment systems had committed inequitable conduct by failing to disclose three “relevant” references at various times. This was a pre-Therasense decision, and the judge had held the IC part of the trial prior to the case-in-chief. Thus, Therasense, “but-for materiality” had not been considered – the district court appears to have used the “reasonable examiner” standard.

The panel distinguished Aventis v. Hospira, 675 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) as based on an “affirmative conduct by the applicants showing not only specific awareness of materiality [but-for materiality had been established at trial], but careful and selective manipulation of where, when and how much of the most material information to disclose…. Evidence of such selective disclosure is not present here.” Slip op. at 13-14.

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Aventis v. Hospira – How to Meet the Therasense Standards

Tuesday, April 10th, 2012

On April 9, 2012, The Fed. Cir. affirmed a holding by the district court that rendered two (then) Sanofi add-on patents on infusion vehicles for docetaxel unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. The inventors, particularly inventor/project manager Fabre, were found to have intentionally decided not to submit two material pieces of prior art to the PTO.

“Materiality” was not an issue on appeal, since the district court had invalidated the patents using the disclosures of the uncited references. Since the references were material under the “clear and convincing standard”, they had to be material under the PTO’s lower ”preponderance of the evidence” standard.

The section on intent is more interesting. The references were not “knock-out” s. 102(b) disclosures of the invention, but rather were used to support invalidation based on s. 103. This left the contemporary relevance of the reference open to some debate, and both the district court and the Fed. Cir. relied heavily on the testimony of inventor Fabre who, unfortunately, testified in detail about his reasons for not submitting the references.

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