Archive for the ‘Patentable Subject Matter’ Category

Part II – Mayo’s Brief Goes Back to A (Non-Precedential) Past

Monday, November 7th, 2011

In my last post on Mayo v. Prometheus, I noted that Mayo is cutting a trail of (legal) tears to ultimately rely on the reasoning underlying the “LabCorp dissent” (548 U.S. 132, 136). In this dissent from a dismissal of cert. as improvidently granted, Justices Breyer, Souter and Stevens urged the Court to consider that all simple diagnostic tests that correlate a level of a chemical marker (like homocysteine) to a pathology (like a vitamin deficiency) were no more than an impermissible attempt to patent a natural phenomenon: “[T]he process is no more than an instruction to read some numbers in light of medical knowledge.”

Mayo relies heavily on the LabCorp dissent to support Part C of its argument that Prometheus’ metabolite level monitoring claims preempt all uses of a natural phenomenon – the correlation between the amount of drug administered and the metabolite levels that occur in the patient as a result of the treatment. “A second defect in Prometheus’ patents is that their administration and testing steps are ‘well known’ and ‘long prevalent in medical practice.” Mayo cites Flook and Bilski, but these decisions did not involve medical technology. Mayo continues: “Prometheus did not invent or make any contribution to either step. Nor was it the first to observe correlations between metabolite levels and dosage adjustments, a concept familiar to physicians for decades.” Pet. brief at 35-36. Apart from the fact that this is a 101/102 argument, Mayo still has not cited any case law. “Well known non-inventive steps cannot turn a natural phenomenon into patentable subject matter. See Morton v New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 882-883 (S.D.N.Y. 1882).”

This troublesome early decision, in which the court denied William Morton et al. a patent for using ether to render patients insensible and unconscious of pain during surgery is characterized by Mayo thusly: “(denying patent for the process of anesthetizing patients with ether because ‘[t]he effect discovered was produced by old agents, operating by old means upon old subjects. The effect alone was new” and as a law of nature ‘is not patentable’)”. Pet. Brief at 36.

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Mayo’s Brief Goes Back To A (Non-Precedential) Future

Thursday, November 3rd, 2011

You all may be suffering from Prometheus v. Mayo fatigue by now, but this remains the most important IP case before the Supreme Court, and may well alter the course of life sciences patenting for the foreseeable future. I know I am falling behind in posting on the appeal, but each party has now filed 59 page briefs. I recently finished Mayo’s brief (a copy provided at the end of this post along with Prometheus’ brief) and I wonder if they really want to clear the high legal fences they are “swinging for.”

The heart of their legal (vs. “This will hurt patients and inhibit research” policy) arguments are that Prometheus’ claims to administering to a patient having an immune-mediated g.i. disorder a drug providing 6-TG (the metabolite), measuring the levels of the metabolite wherein a level under x “indicates a need to increase” subsequent doses and a level over y “indicates a need to decrease” subsequent doses, improperly embed a law of nature or natural correlation with one or two information gathering steps that should be accorded no patentable weight.  (I disagree with the testimony of Prometheus’ expert as summarized by Mayo at page 25, that the doctor who receives the results would infringe even if they were not read. This summary ignores the claim limitation “indicates a need,” which is recognized as functional by Mayo at page 22 of the brief: “[The patents] advise physicians to think about the need for dosage adjustments when metabolites reach certain levels….” For more about “thinking” as a claim element, see below.

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DNA Patenting “Urban Legend” Debunked At AIPLA

Friday, October 21st, 2011

The  most interesting presentation at the Annual AIPLA Meeting – which is not yet over – was Professor Christopher M. Holman’s talk – “Deconstructing the myth that 20% of  the human genome is patented” which was based on his paper in IP Theory, Vol.2, 1 (2011). The “20%” number originated from a single paper, K Jensen and F. Murray, Science 310, 239 (2005)(“The Study”), and has been cited in a number of the briefs by AMP and others attempting to invalidate the Myriad BRCA1/2 patents. However, the authors only searched for patents having claims that recited human DNA SEQ ID NOS or DNA encoding a human protein having SEQ ID NO: X. You might expect this to produce  a lot of false positives, and it did.

Holman analyzed the claims of 533 of the 4270 “gene patents” that the Study included in its “20%” estimate, and grouped them into three categories. Category I were patents with claims deemed irrelevant to genetic testing. These included claims to GMOs, chimeric genes and fusion proteins and recombinant vaccines, for example. About 144 patents fell into this category.  Category II included patents with claims to isolated human DNA of SEQ ID NO: X. These patents included those claiming cDNA as well as genomic DNA. Holman felt that most of these patents would not impede genetic testing since it would normally not be necessary to isolate the target gene sequence. Of course whole genome sequencing would not require the isolation and purification of individual genes. Most of these patents related to the use of cDNA for protein production. Three hundred sixty-six patents were assigned to this category, although there was some overlap with Category III.

Category III patents did contain claims to methods of testing that might be infringed by Myriad-type claims to identifying mutations of interest in personalized medicine. However, only 48 patents fell into this category (!) and only 12 claim the detection of genetic variation by “any means.” (21 of the patents also had Category II claims.) Holman explains, how, even if valid, such claims could be avoided, e.g., by getting your genome sequenced abroad, “importing” the data, and having it read by your U.S. physician. Also, other “gene patents” had lapsed, are about to expire or recite outmoded detection or sequencing methodologies. So the next time someone tries to sell the idea that personalized medicine is hopelessly mired by patent thickets, refer them to this post – or keep a copy of Holman’s timely article close at hand.

Myriad Petition For Rehearing Denied

Wednesday, September 14th, 2011

On September 13, 2011, the Fed. Cir. panel in AMP v. Myriad denied AMP’s (read ACLU’s) petition for rehearing by the panel. (A copy of the petition can be found at the end of this post.) In challenging the holding that the  claimed isolated DNA molecules are not products of nature, AMP argued that “the language of the patents defines the function, not the structure of the patented genes and gene fragments…the composition claims in the patents are not defined by chemical structure. They are defined by function.” The success of this argument would require the panel to read the term, “[a]n isolated DNA” out of claim 1 of the ‘282 patent:

  1. An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2.

Clearly, that was not going to happen, although it appears to be an attempt to riff on dissenter Bryson’s conclusion: “What is claimed in the BRCA genes is the genetic coding material, and that material is the same, structurally and functionally, in both the native gene and the isolated form of the gene.” Slip op. at 13.  However, even “markedly different”  Judge Moore, who presented the best “chemical” analysis of the claims, had no reason to change her views.

AMP’s second argument was hard to follow, but seemed to be based on its opinion that the claimed BRCA1 and 2 gene fragments are inherently present in the body  e.g., in the blood of cancer patients, and so are patent-ineligible natural products. This may be an attempt to reopen the purification vs. isolation argument that held appeal for some of the panel, but arguing that the claimed fragments must arise in vivo “at least some of the time” is not going to carry the day as an inherent anticipation argument, much less as a product of nature argument.

The panel left pending Myriad’s petition for rehearing that challenges AMP et al.’s standing to bring suit, although AMP argued that the American College of Medical Genetics has organizational standing and an additional plaintiff, Ellen Matloff, had conversations about possible infringement with Myriad. AMP may not be in the bottom of the 9th inning yet, but they are in the bottom of the 8th. The panel did such a thorough analysis of the issues that I just don’t see a petition for rehearing en banc getting on base.

 Myriad Petition for Panel Rehearing