Archive for the ‘Written Description Requirements (WDR)’ Category

BSC v. J & J – Written Description Requirement Spreads its Wings

Monday, July 11th, 2011

On June 7th, in a Fed. Cir. panel decision written by Judge Moore, the panel affirmed the invalidation of four J&J patents (a copy of these patents is available at the end of this post) for failure to meet the written description requirement of s.112(1). The patents claimed drug eluting stents, used to keep angioplastied arteries from re-closing, or undergoing restenosis. Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, App. No. 2010- 1230-1234 (Fed. Cir. June 7, 2011). The stents disclosed in the specifications all released rapamycin, a macrocyclic lactone, but the claims were broader, and used terms like “rapamycin or a macrocyclic lactone analog of rapamycin” or a” macrocyclic triene analog of rapamycin.” However, no such rapamycin analogs were disclosed in the specification.

The “problem” with the summary judgment below, at least as J&J saw it, was that a number of workable rapamycin analogs were known to the art as of the effective filing date of the applications. In fact, BSC was using one of them in its stents. J&J felt it could rely on the court’s holding in Capon v Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005) which affirmed that claims to chimeric DNA molecules were adequately supported by the specification in combination with evidence that many examples of useful subunits were known.

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Centocor v. Abbott: Fed. Cir. Takes New Written Description Requirement Out For A Spin.

Friday, February 25th, 2011

In an important post-Ariad decision, the Federal Circuit reversed a district court decision that Abbott’s Humira infringed claims of a Centocor patent that could have cost Abbott $1.67 billion in damages. (A copy of the decision is at the end of this post.) Humira is a fully-humanized antibody against TNF-alpha. While Centocor obtained U.S. Pat. No. 7,070,775 (a copy is available below), that contained claims to such antibodies, it needed to be able to assert the priority of an earlier application in a long chain of CIP filings, in order to pre-date the filing date of Abbott’s patent covering the product. Applying the Ariad v. Lilly written description requirement standards, the Fed. Cir. panel denied Centocor priority, essentially finding no adequate description of a completely humanized antibody in the priority document and thus no description adequate to support the later-issued claims.

Although a number of commentators have already written on this decision, two aspects stand out as deserving attention. The first is how the “new” written description requirement is being used as an “easy button” by the Fed. Cir. to dispose of what, in some cases, are pioneering biotech patents that issue with broad claims. (Apart from Ariad, think back to U. of Rochester v. Searle or even to UC v. Lilly itself). No need to resolve messy and complex factual issues involving enablement issues when, as Judge Prost put it, “A patent also can be held invalid for failure to meet the written description requirement based solely on the face of the patent specification [citing, U of Rochester v. G.D. Searle]…Ultimately, ‘the specification must describe an invention understandable to [a POSA] and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed [citing UC v. Lilly].’”

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RCT v. Microsoft – Fed. Cir. “Accepts” Bilski Invitation

Monday, December 27th, 2010

On December 8, 2010, the Fed. Cir. (Rader writing) reversed the district court’s holding that claims to a process for rendering a half-tone image of a digital image were patent ineligible as an attempt to claim an abstract idea. Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2010-1037 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2010). (A copy is at the end of this post.) The claims given in the opinion involved the use of an “improved blue noise mask.” The panel spent 10 pages of its 25 page opinion explaining the technology and reproducing claims, and I still don’t have a clue how this technology works (it involves use of an algorithm as well!). The main process claims quite clearly would fail the M or T test, but the courts have more to work with now, and the panel got right to work.

Not surprisingly, the panel had a lot to say about the Supreme Court’s Bilski decision, particularly what it left unsaid:

“Indeed, the Supreme Court in Bilski re-focused this court’s inquiry into processes on the question of whether the subject matter of the invention is abstract. The Supreme Court did not presume to provide a rigid formula or definition for abstractness [citation omitted]. Instead, the Supreme Court invited this court to develop ‘other limiting criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.”

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Director Kappos Comments on Ariad v. Lilly

Thursday, May 6th, 2010

USPTO David Kappos recently posted a comment on the Fed. Cir. decision in Ariad v. Lilly in which he noted that the Fed. Cir. held that broad functional claims (presumably mechanism-of-action claims) must be supported by sufficient species (read “working examples”). While Director Kappos clearly approves of this holding, he does no more to provide guidance to Examiners attempting to decide how many examples will support such claims and, more importantly, are there generic claims for which no number of working examples would provide sufficient support (like the Ariad claims at issue)?