Posts Tagged ‘USPTO’

USPTO Encourages Prosecution After Final – Sort of

Wednesday, April 4th, 2012

Although entry of any amendments after final rejection has always be discretionary with Examiners, for pretty much my entire career, I have had good luck continuing prosecution after final rejection – sometimes filing multiple Rule 116 amendments or making multiple calls – not really interviews – to the Examiner. I have found most Examiners willing to “continue talking” after final, and even to grant formal interviews – particularly if it is the first one in the application.

Now the PTO has formalized “Let’s Make A Deal” which is a set of guidelines that, cautiously, encourages Examiners to continue to consider post-final amendment, even if it requires some – but not too much – further consideration. Let’s hope this will lead to a more productive, less adversarial relationship, between prosecutors and Examiners, so that applicants feel less “forced” to simply give up and file an RCE.  I continue to believe that the backlog would noticeably shrink if Examiners were required to pick up the phone after receiving a Rule 116 Amendment, and not just print out the “standard” Advisory Action refusing to enter the amendment.

 

USPTO Press Release

PTO To Biotech Examiners – We’ll Get Back To You!

Monday, March 26th, 2012

On March 21, 2012, Andrew H Hirschfield, Associate Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, sent a short memo to the Patent Examining Corps to inform them about the decision in Prometheus v. Mayo. The “preliminary guidance” that was provided included a statement that mainly this decision did not affect the PTO’s Bilski guidelines re patenting “abstract ideas” (so keep calm software/business method Groups).

The memo described the unpatentable laws of nature at issue as “the relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a thiopurine drug dosage with prove ineffective or cause harm.” The memo noted that “the claimed processes [the "invention as a whole"] are likewise not patent eligible unless they have additional features that provide practical assurance that the processes are genuine applications of these laws rather than drafting efforts designed to monopolize the correlations. [The Court found that] the additional steps in the claimed processes here are not themselves natural laws, but neither are they sufficient to transform the nature of the claims.”

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Myriad Revisited – The Consequences of Prometheus Unbound

Thursday, March 22nd, 2012

In my last post on Prometheus, I concluded: It is hard to think of a diagnostic assay claim that does not either detect the +/- presence of a marker (like anti-HIV antibodies) or involve the comparison of the level of a marker of some sort (like homocystine or PSA) with a benchmark level (which could be normal or pathological)…all of these assays seem to have been converted into no more that the discovery of laws of nature” with unpatentable pre-solution and post-“processing” steps. I wrote that the key phrase in the decision may be that the steps were “specified at a [too] high level of generality.”

But how much generality is too much generality? Justice Breyer teases patent attorneys like Gypsy Rose Lee at her best – offering a glimpse of a rule, then whisking it away from an ever more agitated audience. For example, at page 18 of the slip op. he writes:

“We need not, and do not, now decide whether were the steps at issue here less conventional, these features [the administration, assay and indication steps] of the claims would prove sufficient to invalidate them. For here, as we have said, the steps add nothing of significance to the natural laws themselves.”

The reader of this opinion keeps waiting for Justice Breyer to give us some  hint of the degree of unconventionality or amount of significance that would suffice in the context of a diagnostic test “to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law”, but none is forthcoming. Instead, there is a lengthy discussion of a UK decision – Neilson v. Haford – that involved an improved method of blowing air into a furnace by using a pre-heated receptacle chamber for the air. Breyer writes: ‘thus, the claimed process included not only a law of nature but also several unconventional steps (such as inserting the receptacle, applying heat to the receptacle externally, and blowing the air into the furnace that confined the claims to a particular, useful application of the principle.” Slip. op. at 14-15.

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A “Modest Proposal” For The RCE Crisis

Friday, February 10th, 2012

Commentators, including Prof. Hal Wegner, have been sounding the alarm regarding the increasing number of requests for continuing examination that applicants are filing. The PTO projects 325,000 RCE’s by FY 2018. They have gone further in recent posts, in attributing these filings to “outlier examiners” who refuse to continue prosecution after final rejection, even after agreeing that fairly simple amendments would result in allowance.  Some of these examiners are intent on “making law” – in other words, they have the tenure to ignore the MPEP and controlling decisional law. Other examiners are simply “young,” at least in experience. I find that these Examiners fail to allow applications because they don’t understand the concepts of burden or proof and/or what is, or is not, evidence of patentability. Wegner writes, “All the good intentions to improve the patent system will be for naught if the RCE continues to be used by outliers within the Office to swamp the system for personal production goals.” Hal has suggested a system whereby, after final rejection, applicants can petition to have the application transferred to another Group Unit for review by a senior examiner.

Given that these outlier examiners cannot be fired or retired, I think the solution is to bring back the “strong Practice Specialists” and to bring them back in force. From the mid- 90’s until about 2003, Group 1600/1800 had three “strong Practice Specialists” – Richard Schwartz, Brian Stanton and Margaret Parr. I only worked with the first two, but heard many good reports about Margaret as well. Needless to say, they are no longer at the Office. These were bright, experienced (ex-)Examiners who had real power to effectively compel examiners to allow cases.

This is how the system worked. If the issues were extremely focused – meaning that 99% of the time the final rejection was based on alleged anticipation or on a fairly straightforward obviousness rejection – often based on just one or two references – and the Examiner was clearly (of course) wrong – I would call Richard or Brian. They would pull a number of the examiner’s pending cases at once – so as to attempt to prevent retribution if they determined that I was wrong –and review the rejection in question. If they agreed with me, they would walk into the examiner’s office and tell them why he/she should allow the case. If the examiner absolutely refused, the case might go to appeal, but they could block the examiner from filing an Answer. Although Brian and Richard did not always agree with me, I never had to go this far. They could also offer a compromise. Historically, Director John Doll absorbed a lot of criticism for how he ran 1600/1800 in this period but this is one thing he got right.

So, Director Kappos, let’s try it again. Only let’s unleash an “A Team” of thirty or more Practice Specialists with a mandate to break up the types of stalemates that lead to RCEs. I know that there are Prosecution Ombudsmen, but so far as I can tell they have no clout, particularly with senior outlier examiners. Appeal Conferences have been no help, either. Applicants cannot participate and a negative outcome – almost assured since the examiner and his SPE or Group Director are going to make up 2/3 of the panel – will only lead to more RCEs.  Simple raising the cost to applicants to file an RCE or to appeal is not a fix, not when they have no choice. Let’s have some change that matters, to coin a phrase.