BIOTECH INDUSTRY IN MINNESOTA – STAYIN’ ALIVE

In its July 3rd issue, the Minneapolis St. Paul Business Journal published a list of the “Top 25 Biotech Companies.” It tells a pretty sad story. The top 25 companies together employ fewer than 3000 workers in Minnesota. The top four employ 85% of them, and two of them, Beckman Coulter Inc. and Syngenta Seeds, are branches of much larger companies. I am also not sure how the companies were selected for the list. Most of them either sell reagents or test kits to the biotech industry or provide diagnostic services. Others, like Cima Labs, SurModics, Innovative Surface Technologies, and Receptors partner with pharma and med device companies to develop drug delivery technologies based on coating and other surface modification technologies. None are exclusively involved in developing biological therapeutic agents for the treatment of human afflictions, with the possible exception of Bioenergy, Inc., that is working on medical applications of ribose. I have lived here for 25 years and no one has ever been able to explain to my satisfaction why Minnesota is a leader in the medical device industry (you should see their list, which starts with Medronic), but has never developed a biotech industry. I am not an economist, and I dont want to over-analyze, but re ipsa loquitor.

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Board Decision in Ex Parte Roberts Doesn’t Make the Cut

This 2008 pre-Bilski decision is of interest since the Board purportedly applied the Diamond v Diehr “standard” – “[t}ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines” (450 U.S. at 184) – that the Federal Circuit adopted as the rule by which to judge whether or not a process or method claim is patentable subject matter. The Board applied this much-criticized test to affirm the Examiner’s ruling that a claim to a method to provide LASIK corrective surgery that was patient-customized was not patentable subject matter under section 101. Here is some of the relevant language from the decision:

“The claimed invention deals with a methodology for improving refractive opthlamic treatment. The steps of claim 120 include (a) obtaining a first measurement of a cornea; (b) determining a first ablation specification based on this first measurement; (c) obtaining perturbation data from the cornea to obtain biodynamic response data; (d) correlating…Steps (a), (c) and (d) are actions that can be characterized as data gathering steps. Steps (b), (e) and (f) are actions that can be characterized as mental steps in forming an individualized ablation specification….The claim does not include any recitation of a particular machine used to implement the claimed steps. The steps could be performed entirely by a human being with no machine involvement whatsoever.” (Appeal No. 2008-1355 July 15, 2008)

Oh really! I’d like to see that (actually it would be to gruesome to watch). Step (c) of claim 120 actually reads “obtaining non-tissue removing perturbation data from the cornea.” In rebutting a section 112 rejection, appellants argued (and the Board did not dispute) that the non-tissue removing perturbation is accomplished by making an incision in the cornea to form a corneal flap (“cutting the corneal flap”), which is then put back into place after the measurements are taken. At the least, this is a transformation of matter (corneal tissue) with a machine adapted to do this delicate procedure (e.g., a very sharp knife called a microketratome). I would (not) like to see this procedure carried out “with no machine involvement whatsoever.”

In fact, in their later obviousness analysis, the Board appears to recognize that perturbing is cutting: “Further it is unclear what the Appellants deem constitutes a surgical procedure. For example, it appears to us as though the step of perturbing the cornea entails a surgical procedure on the eye. The claims do not recite any other steps that include another surgical procedure on the eye.”

Well, how many surgical procedures on the eye are required to transform the article into different state? Finally, I hope that Ohio State University, the owner of the application, was aware that claims to “medical activities,” just like this one, while impliedly patentable subject matter under section 101, may be infringed without any liability for damages, at least by doctors and their employers. See 35 USC 287(c)(1). This section was added to the patent statutes in 1996 after one eye doctor got a patent on a method of performing cataract surgery and sued a competitor who was using the same technique. But that’s another story.

I want to thank Michael D. Stein of Woodcock Washburn for bringing this decision to my attention. We will be presenting an AIPLA Webinar on the evolution of patentable subject matter on September 2, 2009. Keep an eye out for us.

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Federal Circuit Mows Down Bean Patent – Reading Between the Rows

On July 10, 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re Pod-Ners, Appeal No. 2008-1492, affirmed the Board’s rejection of all of the claims of U.S. Pat. No. 5,894,079. The Board had rejected as obvious claims to, inter alia, a pinto bean plant producing yellow beans of a certain color, as well as claims to the beans themselves, which had been deposited in the ATTC. The claims were rejected over a publication argued to disclose the same yellow bean, in view of another non-prior art publication relied upon as demonstrating that the claimed bean and the “well known” yellow bean are gentically identical.

While only six pages long, and eminently predictable given the fact that the Mexican government had alleged theft of their biological heritage, the decision feels muddled. To begin with, the panel clearly would have preferred to invalidate the patent as anticipated by the “well-known” yellow bean, “Azufrado Peruano 87.” The law is well-settled that non-prior art publications can be relied upon to show that a prior art reference is, in fact, anticipatory. But whether anticipated by, or obvious in view of, the prior art publication, it seems that the panel should have acknowledged that the prior art publication which, after all, disclosed a plant variety, was enabling. Historically, a printed publication could not per se place a plant variety in the possession of the public; the public was believed to, in fact, need to have access to the plant. This gap was simply filled by the panel by noting that the older variety was “well known.” This is getting pretty exotic, but I seem to recall a decision which held that evidence of the commercial sale of a plant described in a printed publication was sufficient to render the publication enabling. This decision validated the PTO’s examination policy then in effect. Does anyone but me remember that decision?

Finally, the decision has an odd anti-biotech air about it that I don’t think I am imagining. In April, the Fed. Cir. overturned In re Dueul and In re Bell finding a previously unisolated and unexpressed cDNA sequence obvious, primarily because it would have been obvious to use known techniques to isolate the “gene” and to express it as a protein that was known to exist, but had not itself been isolated. In re Pod-Ners, the panel concluded:

“The Board correctly held that the subject matter of the ‘079 patent – yellow beans, the plants they produced and a method for reproducing such plants by cross-breeding – would have been obvious to one [of] ordinary skill in what POD-NERS identifies as the “breeder-grower” art. … [Appelant] does not contend that he devised or applied new or unexpected techniques in reproducing the beans.”

Now substitute “cDNA encoding the NAIL protein, the NAIL protein produced thereby and a method for cloning the DNA” for the description of the holding of the Board given above, and you have the Kubin decision. The patentee in fact had isolated yellow beans (the DNA sequence) from a bag of beans of various colors (the genome) and bred (“cloned”) them so that they became a unique cultivar.

The panel affirmed the invalidity of the claims to the cultivar, which was recited to have a “yellow coat described as within a narrow range of shades of yellow on a particular color chart” without ever stating that the “prior art” bean was the same color. In fact, the panel conceded that the beans may only have been “substantially the same”. If patentee had obtained a Plant Patent instead of a utility patent, the opponents and the court would have had to find that the cultivars were indistinguishable in appearance in order to invalidate the patent. However, Plant Patents are not available for plants that reproduce via seed. My comment is becoming as long as the decision, as I try to turn it into a fable, but it is adamantly not “Jack and the Beanstalk.” These beans did not bring their owner a pot of gold. In the end, the patent wasn’t worth a hill o’ beans.

ETCGroup

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COURT “CUSSES OUT” SANOFI – HOLDS OXALIPLATIN PATENT NOT INFRINGED

For some years, Tom Irving of Finnegan Farabow, et al. has been giving a very amusing, but increasingly serious, talk about the dangers of what he calls “Patent Profanity.” The version I heard in May was, “Patently Profane at You and Your Client’s Peril.” He warns that the specification and prosecution history will be used by the courts to construe the claims, and that appellate review of claim construction is de novo. By “patent profanity,” he means statements in the specification or arguments made in the prosecution history that will lead the court to ignore the once well-established maxim that “[a]s a general proposition, a limitation that does not exist in a claim should not be read into that claim.” McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 150 U.S. 110 (1895) The district courts, following the lead of the Federal Circuit, have increasingly side-stepped this principle by casting the issue as one of claim interpretation, not of claim limitation:

“We recognize that there is sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into a claim from the specification. …In locating this ‘fine line’ it is useful to remember that we look to the specification to ascertain the meaning of the claim term as it is used by the inventor in the context of the entirety of his invention, and not merely to limit a claim term.” Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

That is a fine line indeed. The point of Tom’s talk is to warn the prep/pros community about the need to avoid terms (often adjectives) that will lead a court to cross that “fine line,” even when they recognize it in the first place. He indentifies assertions like “special” (as in form), “peculiar” (as in effect achieved), “necessary,” “critical,” “key”(as in a feature), “necessarily” (as in the type of product), “requires,” “important,” “essential,” “unique,” and on and on. Even using “is” can lead to an unexpectedly narrow claim construction, e.g., “Feature X is the basic structure of element X of all embodiments herein disclosed and contemplated.”

On June 18, 2009, Judge Pisano (D.N.J.) held that U.S. Pat. No. 5,338,874 was not infringed by a group of generic drug companies, thus clearing the way for generic versions of oxaliplatin, an important drug in therapy for colorectal cancer. This opinion, document 378 in Sanofi-Aventis v. Sandoz, Inc., Lead Civil Action No. 07-2762 (JAP), is a prime example of how easy it is for defendants to convince a court to limit claims to (even) a compound to the disclosed method of making it.

The ‘874 patent contains only one independent claim: “Optically pure [oxaliplatin] having the general formula of Formula I:….” This isomer of oxaliplatin is referred to in the opinion as “l-OHP,” e.g., the “L” enantiomer. So this is a compound claim and, as the court noted more than once: “product claims generally are not limited by how the product is produced.” In fact, the specification contains a fair helping of the language of qualification that we all use when disclosing how the compounds we want to claim are prepared – that the compound “may be prepared in accordance with” the “illustrative method” thereafter described, and that “a representative process of preparing” the compound is described in the examples. However, the only process disclosed in the specification to isolate l-OHP was preparative HPLC. The defendants used other processes and argued that the claim should be interpreted as a product-by-process claim. They moved for S.J. of non-infringement.

It is worth noting that the ‘874 patent is an add-on patent; the primary patent on oxaliplatin had expired. These days, betting against infringement or validity of an “add-on patent” in Hatch-Waxman litigation is a pretty safe bet (but, again, this is a “compound patent” not a treatment regimen or formulation patent). Also, it originated from a Japanese company, and the U.S. translation is awkward. Still, it was clearly “patent profanity,” particularly during the prosecution, and to some extent, taken from deposition testimony, that caused the court to hold that “the claims of the ‘874 patent are properly construed as product-by-process claims.” Motion granted.

It is a bit of a job to separate the court’s discussion of patent profanity from the patent profanity actually used during prosecution, but applicants attorneys had argued that “[o]nly after HPLC resolution, in accordance with the teaching of the present specification, was optical purity obtained, and that the inventors “developed a specific HPLC method and show[sic] that they were able to manufacture [the optical isomer of high purity].” The court relied heavily on the former argument, stating: “Thus, the Applicant did not attempt to rebut the examiner’s rejection by simply pointing to the lesser purity of the prior art compound, it was unequivocal that ‘[o]nly after HPLC resolution’ was the claimed purity achieved.” The court noted that the Examiner relied on these representations.

So what is the takeaway message, except to note that not even simple “compound claims” are safe from conversion into narrower product-by-process claims? The solution is not to add more potential synthetic routes, although this may be possible in some cases. It is to avoid “patent profanity” at all costs. Argue the novel inherent properties of the compounds, and not how clever your inventors were to have been able to make it in the first place. Don’t “attribute” the novel properties to any particular method-of-making. Sadly, in this case “only,” “specific” prep HPLC does not even seem to have been all that “critical,” “key,” “necessary,” “essential,” or “required” to obtain the claimed compound. Excuse my language!

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