Posts Tagged ‘ip’

Major Changes to IP Law in Australia Enacted

Thursday, April 19th, 2012

This guest post by Tom Gumley, PhD, a partner in the well-known Freehills Patent and Trademark firm provides a lengthy guide to the changes wrought by Australia’s new patent law, that was enacted on April 15, 2012. The law brings Australia closer to the US in many of its legal standards and, like the AIA, goes into effect at various times in the future.

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We are pleased to provide Freehills’ guide to Australia’s new patent law [available at the end of this post] that was signed into law on April 15, 2012.

This new law will have far-reaching consequences for those seeking and enforcing patent rights in Australia, and ultimately will establish a class of new Act patents to which higher validity standards required by the new law will apply, and old Act patents to which relatively lower validity standards established by the old law will apply.

There will also be important consequences regarding exemption from infringement for patentees and alleged infringers with the codification of experimental use provisions, and a broadening of old law exemptions to cover acts done for seeking regulatory approval of any product for which approval is required for marketing.

If you or your clients have business interests in Australia, it is very important that you come to an understanding of the new law sooner rather than later, as in many instances, the opportunities to be had and the risks to be mitigated under the new law will require you to take relevant action now.

Given the complexity of the new law, our commentary is necessarily of a general nature and we strongly advise you to contact us should you require professional advice on any particular issue.

Regards,

Tom Gumley PhD
Partner
Freehills Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys

Guide to Australia’s new patent law

Supreme Court Reverses In Caraco Appeal

Tuesday, April 17th, 2012

Today, in Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, in an opinion authored by Justice Kagan (a copy can be found at the end of this post), the Court reversed the Fed. Cir.’s divided 2010 decision that an ANDA filer (a “generic drug company”) sued in para. IV litigation cannot assert a counterclaim that the NDA holder (“the innovator”) listed a use code in the FDA Orange Book that is overly broad. This question is important because during litigation, Novo had broadened its use code to cover uses Caraco alleged were not within the claims of the listed patents, but which Caraco wanted to be able to include in its labeling. So the question presented was:

“Whether an ANDA applicant may assert a counterclaim under Section 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) by alleging that the brand name manufacturer’s patent information [the use code] does not accurately and precisely describe the method of use claimed by its patent.”

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Mayo v. Prometheus – A European View

Thursday, March 29th, 2012

A Guest Post from Paul Cole, European Patent Attorney, Lucas & Co; Professor of IP law, Bournemouth University.

Is a claim to an assay patent-eligible when all its features are known save for how it should be interpreted? The interpretation is clinically significant because it allows a family of drugs to be administered safely even though a minority of patients are at risk of significant and in some instances fatal side-effects. Before the invention knowledge was available to enable the practical steps in the assay to be carried out and measurements had been made but their clinical interpretation was not understood.

A European answer is to be found partly in the “any hardware” approach first set out in T 931/95 PBS PARTNERSHIP/Controlling pension benefits system and approved by the Enlarged Appeal Board in in G 3/08 PRESIDENT’S REFERENCE. It was pointed out that a computer-readable data storage medium had the technical effects of being computer-readable and of being capable of storing data and is patent-eligible under EPC arts 52(2) and (3). On that basis it could not become ineligible merely because it was storing computer program X, any more than a cup which was a technical article could become ineligible merely because it was decorated with picture X. There was no case-law to support the view that a claim to “a computer-readable storage medium with program X written on it” should lose its technical character merely because it was too generic or functionally defined.

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Supreme Court Remands In Myriad Appeal

Monday, March 26th, 2012

Today, as predicted by many commentators, the Supreme Court set aside the ruling by the Fed. Cir. that claims to isolated DNA sequences that are the BRCA 1 or 2 gene, or fragments thereof, are patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court ordered the Fed. Cir. to reconsider its 2-1 panel decision in view of its recent opinion in Prometheus that assays to optimizing drug efficacy based on measuring metabolite levels were no more than attempts to patent natural phenomena.

It is not entirely clear what guidance the Prometheus opinion provides for the appealed DNA claims in the Myriad decision. After all, the claims closest to the invalidated Prometheus claims were the claims to a method of locating mutations in a subject’s BRCA DNA by comparing it to a benchmark, or wild-type BRCA sequence. In the Supreme Court’s opinion, Justice Breyer contrasted the claims at issue with claims to a new compound:

 “Unlike, say, a typical patent on a new drug or a new way of using an existing drug, the [Promethus claims] do not confine their reach to particular applications of those  [natural laws].”

To invalidate claims to isolated DNA sequences, the Fed. Cir. and the Supreme Court would have to specifically interpret Chakrabarty to require that, to be “new” under section 101, a compound must exhibit a utility not possessed by the compound pre-isolation, even if the compound pre-isolation is structurally different than the compound post-isolation.  If the Fed. Cir. were simply to rely on In re Bergy, as I and others have suggested in previous posts on Myriad, it is difficult to imagine the Fed. Cir. reversing itself on this issue.

Even if gold in a streambed is not different from gold in a Krugerrand, isolated DNA in a “test tube”  is different from a DNA sequence that is one part of chromosomal DNA. However, the Supreme Court just added a “something more” requirement to a claim to optimizing a drug regimen, and the Court may be poised to put a “something more” requirement on a structurally novel chemical compound. I just hope that if the judges or justices go down this path, and hold that isolated DNA is a “natural product,”  they give us some hint of how to meet the “something more” requirement, going forward. They might also consider what “going forward” means.