GlaxoSmithKline v. Banner Pharmacaps – Written Description Requirement 101

In a short opinion dated February 24, 2014 (App. Nos. 2013-1593, -94, -95, -98), a Fed. Cir. panel made short work of the defendants’ attempt to invalidate a Glaxo claim in U.S. Pat. No. 5,565,467, to dutasteride “or a pharmaceutically acceptable solvate thereof” on the basis that the term “[dutasteride] solvate” failed to meet the written description requirement (“WDR”). The district court construed a “solvate” of this steroidal drug to mean “a complex formed by dutasteride in which dutasteride is reacted or from which it is precipitated or crystallized.”

While the parties agreed that dutasteride “is the molecule identified before ‘or a pharmaceutically acceptable solvate thereof’,” the panel noted that the defendants failed to argue that there was an inadequate description of “pharmaceutically acceptable” – this term had been construed to mean “suitable for use  when administered to the recipient thereof as a pharmaceutical”- and hinted that its ruling might have been different had the defendants adopted this approach, rather than arguing simple lack of an adequate disclosure of enough species to support the genus of dutasteride solvates.

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Lightning Ballast II – Judge Lourie Tries to Get to “The Facts of the Matter”

Wooden gavel. - IstockAfter reading all 88 pages of this very scholarly opinion which left patent law right where it was post-Cybor – no matter how much weight the parties and amici felt stare decisis deserved – I went back and read Judge Lourie’s concurrence. It is mercifully brief and tries to cast some of the substantive issues in real-world contexts. He writes like a “Dutch uncle” – which the dictionary defines as one who “admonishes sternly and bluntly.” Whether or not you agree with his conclusions, he gets his points across like arrows in “The Hunger Games.”

He reduces the debate about the proper reading of Markman II simply by saying that the distinction between calling claim interpretation a “question of law” vs. a “question for the court” is not a substantial one. Whether or not the Supreme Court will disagree if cert. is granted is a question for another day.

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Federal Circuit Reaffirms Cybor Standard in Lightning Ballast Rehearing

On Friday, a narrow majority of the Fed. Cir. sitting en banc, reaffirmed that claim interpretation is a question of law, to be reviewed de novo upon appeal to the Fed. Cir. (A copy of the decision can be found below.) Judge Newman, for once writing for the majority, ruled that the weight of stare decisis tipped the balance toward not overturning the 1998 Cybor decision, also en banc, which established the de novo standard. Judge Newman wrote that Cybor properly implemented the Supreme Court’s ruling in Markman II (1992) that claim construction is a question of law, and not a question of fact or even a mixed question of law and fact.

She noted the difficulty the Fed. Cir. would face if it had to decide that “a fact was at issue” in any district court ruling on claim interpretation and noted that Cybor did not displace the lower court’s power to rule on many other issues, such as infringement, validity and damages.

Pens will be flying across the law review and blogoshere spaces for years analyzing this decision and I have not had time to read all of it this morning, but the traditional closing of “more later” is certainly an understatement.

12-1014-opinion-2-18-2014-1

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CLS v. Alice Bank And The Cult Of The “Abstract Idea”

Ex-Judge Michel’s compelling amicus brief – more on that in a future post—prompted me to take a quick look back at the evolution “abstract idea” as a patent-ineligible category of invention. This category of patent-ineligible invention is listed, along with laws of nature and physical phenomena, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, but the Supreme Court, unfortunately did not provide any examples of abstract ideas.

Fast forward 28 years to In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The court was deciding whether or not a straightforward claim to hedging risk in commodity markets was patent-eligible subject matter. The divided majority held that the claim failed the machine-or-transformation test and so was not, but it is Judge Rader’s dissent that deserves attention. He concluded that Bilski’s claim fell outside of patent-eligible processes because it “facially abstract.” He wrote:

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