Posts Tagged ‘biotechnology law’

En (many) banc(s) Fed. Cir. decides CLS Bank v. Alice Corp. (Part 1)

Monday, May 13th, 2013

On May 10th, the Federal Circuit issued a short per curium opinion affirming the district court’s decision that “a majority of the court affirms the [holding below] that the asserted method and computer-readable media claims are not directed to eligible subject matter under 35 USC s. 101. An equally divided court affirms the district court’s holding that the asserted system claims are not directed to eligible subject matter under that statute.” On page 2, the “majority’ writes:

“While Chief Judge Rader is correct to note that no single opinion issued today commands a majority, seven of the ten members, a majority of this en banc court have agreed that the method and computer readable medium claims before us fail to recite patent-eligible subject matter. In addition, eight judges, a majority, have concluded that the particular method, medium and system claims at issue [for reducing the risk of non-performance of an agreement between two parties by using a trusted third party to hold the pot] – in this case should rise or fall together in the s. 101 analysis.”

Not a promising overture to this legal opera. A novelette of five concurring, concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part(2), concurring-in-part and dissenting opinions and even “additional reflections” (by Chief Judge Rader) follows and I certainly have not consumed all 140+ pages of that content by any means.

The opinion begins with a 38 page concurrence by Judges Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna and Wallach. In my post on this appeal in October, I summarized the “facts of the matter” and emphasized the tension between Cybersource v. Retail Decisions (no patents for mental processes that can be performed with pencil and paper and no Beauregard claims either) and Ultramercial v. Wild Tangent, where an 11-step process to distribute copyrighted products via the internet was found to be patent-eligible, in part due to its “intricate and complex computer programming” and specific application of the internet in a cyber-market environment. On one side, you end up on the slippery slope of defining an abstract idea. On the other, you are faced with arguing that a rock with e = mc2 carved into it is patentable. So I was more than a little interested in how this tension would play itself out (or if it would).

CLSBankMay10

Complimentary Webinar: Bringing Biotech Innovation to Market

Thursday, May 9th, 2013

Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner, P.A. and Cornell University have teamed up to give you the latest developments in “Bringing Biotech Innovation to Market.”  The live webinar will be presented on Friday, May 17th @ 12 PM (EDT).  For more information and to register, click here.

Allergan V. Sandoz – When Everything “Old” Is “New” Again

Thursday, May 2nd, 2013

On Tuesday, a divided panel of the Fed. Cir. found that Allergan’s claimed method of reducing the number of daily topical doses of brimonidine to treat glaucoma from 3 to 2 doses by administering a composition containing 0.2% brimonidine and 0.5% timolol, as unobvious, even though both drugs were known to be effective to treat glaucoma and the two drugs had been administered serially twice a day rather than three times a day. Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., App. No. 2011-1619, -1620, -1635, -1639 (Fed. Cir. May 1, 2013). The majority of the panel reached this conclusion even after finding that the composition claims were obvious in view of the art, and after recognizing that an inherency doctrine may apply to an otherwise obvious claim, as well as to support an anticipation rejection.

In other words, the dissent (Dyk) “would find [the method claim] obvious on the grounds that it merely claims the result of treatment with an obvious composition.” The majority (Proust and O’Malley) distinguished decisions in which “patentee claimed either a previously unknown result or an undisclosed inherent property of an otherwise anticipated claim, citing Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Ben Venue Labs., 246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In this decision, the court  considered a claim to reduce the side-effects of a known anti-cancer drug by using a specific dosing regimen. The process, in its entirety, was found in the prior art, and the B-M court stated that “[i]n the context of anticipation, ‘[n]ewly discovered results of known process directed to the same purpose are not patentable because such results are inherent.’” Id. At 1376.

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Federal Court Affirms BPAI in Dawson v. Dawson and Bowman

Wednesday, March 27th, 2013

This is a guest post from Theresa Stadheim of Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner

In Chandler Dawson v. Chandler Dawson and Lyle Bowman, Appeal Nos. 2012-1214,-1215,-1216, -1217 (Fed. Cir. March 25, 2013) (a copy can be found at the end of this post), the Federal Circuit affirmed a Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) interference decision that Chandler Dawson was not the sole inventor of the inventions covered by U.S. Patent No. 6,239,113 (“the ‘113 patent”) and U.S. patent No. 6,569,443 (“the ‘443 patent”).

Chandler Dawson was an employee of UCSF in the summer of 1997 when he gave a presentation to the World Health Organization (WHO) about topical use of an antibiotic for treating eye infections.  During the presentation and during subsequent presentations and discussions about the antibiotic, Dawson stated that he was having trouble formulating a delivery mechanism for the eye drug.  After a delivery mechanism was created, without the assistance of Dawson, Dawson and another party, Dr. Lyle Bowman, filed patent applications assigned to InSite that later issued as the ‘113 patent and the ‘443 patent.  UCSF then filed a patent application, essentially copying the ‘113 and ‘443 patent specification and claims and naming Dawson as the sole inventor, to provoke an interference proceeding.  The issue in the interference proceedings came down to a determination of who conceived of the inventions, and when they conceived of the inventions.

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