In Teva v. Sandoz, decided yesterday by a 7-2 decision of the S. Ct., the lengthy dissent by Justices Alito and Thomas invoked the dreaded “zone of uncertainty” – a dangerous bar of shifting legal sands that defendants should not have to cross. This legal quicksand was recently invoked in Nautilus v. Biosig to justify raising the requirements of s. 112(2) from insolubly ambiguous to reasonably certainty, and has its roots in Markman and Festo, 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). Justice Thomas writes:
“So damaging is this unpredictability that we identified uniformity as an ‘independent’ reason justifying our allocation of claim construction to the court… The majority’s rule provides litigants who prevail in district court to take advantage of this uncertainly by arguing on appeal that the district court’s claim construction involved subsidiary findings of fact. At best, today’s holding will spawn costly [and meritless] – collateral litigation over the line between law and fact.” Slip. op. at 16 [dissent].






